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WILL THE CALIFORNIA ALIEN LAND LAW
STAND THE TEST OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT?
The Fourteenth Amendment has had the most intricate and the
most interesting history of any part of our Constitution. Adopted
through the pressure caused by a concrete social and political
situation-the chaotic condition of the South at the close of the
Civil War-we can see now that it was little.more than a war
measure for the relief of the negro race. It served this purpose
only as a temporary expedient. After a long period of compara-
tive inactivity it suddenly sprang into prominence as a measure
to protect the corporations-chiefly of the public service type-
from state regulation and control.' In this capacity it is now
showing great vitality. Since the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in the celebrated Minnesota Rate Cases2 the railroads Uow
have no appeal from state regulation of intrastate rates except
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Japanese race question on the Pacific Coast presents to us
the most recent as well as the most serious problem that has
arisen for a long time under this provision of the Federal Consti-
tution. To this we shall now give our attention.
In 1900 there were 10,151 Japanese in California. In 1910
there were 41,356, and in 1912 the figures are given at 58,000.
In the latter year they owned -1-2,726 acres of land and leased
18,000 acres in addition. 3
The Californians, seeing that the Japanese could live much
more cheaply than the pative population, while at the same time
working just as hard and just as efficiently, have, after much
agitation, passed a law the purpose of which is to prevent the
Japanese from outstripping and ultimately supplanting them in
the struggle for existence. The question is at bottom an economic
one. Out of it, however, grow many complications-social, politi-
cal and diplomatic.
The race element forms an important factor in the problem.
The Japanese are a proud and sensitive people. They are capable
1 See my vol., "The Fourteenth Amendment and the States", Little,
Brown & Co., 1912.
2 Decided June 9, 1913.
Report of the State Commissioner of Labor.
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of the highest physical and intellectual efficiency. We need not
therefore discuss the question whether the one race be superior
to the other. There remains the more important and fundamental
question of race compatibility. The Californians feel very
strongly that there can be no efficient co6peration between Jap-
anese and Americans. And seeing the possibility of a greater
increase of Japanese immigration, they have fears for the future.
The Federal Government itself has, by denying citizenship to the
Japanese, tacitly admitted the existence of race incompatibiliy.
This law was enacted for the manifest purpose of preventing-
the Japanese from gaining any further foothold on the soil of
California. It applies also to the Chinese, but they being ex-
cluded from this country by the immigration laws, need not here
be considered. The law reads as follows:
An act relating to the rights, powers, and disabilities of aliens
and of certain companies, associations, and corporations with
respect to property in this state, providing for escheats in
certain cases, prescribing the procedure therein, and repeal-
ing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent or in conflict here-
with.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of
the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and in-
herit real property, or any interest therein, in this state in the
same manner and to the same extent as citizens 9f the United
States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.
Sec. 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in Section 1 of
this act may acquire, possess, enjoy, and transfer real property,
or any interest therein, in this state in the manner and to the ex-
tent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing
between the Government of the United States and the nation or
country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not other-
wise, and may, in addition thereto, lease land§ in this state for
agricultural purposes for a term not exceeding three years.
Sec. 3. Any company, association, or corporation organized
under the laws of this or any other state or nation, of which a
majority of the members are aliens other than those specified in
Section 1 of this act, or in which a majofity of the issued capital
stock is owned by such aliens, may acquire, possess, enjoy, and
convey real propertr, or any interest therein, in this state in the
mannerand to. the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any
treaty now existing between the .Government of the United Stateg
and the nation or country of which such members or stockholders
are citizens or subjects ind not otherwise, and may, in addition
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thereto , lease lands in this state for agricultural purposes for a
term not exceeding three years.
Sec. 4. Whenever it appears to the court in any probate pro-
ceeding that, by reason of the provisions of this act, any heir or
devisee can not take real property in this state which, but for said
provisions, said heir or devisee would take as such, the court,
instead of ordering a distribution of such real property to such
heir or devisee, shall order a sale of said real property to be made
in the manner provided by law for probate sales of real property,
and the proceeds of such sale shall be distributed to such heir or
devisee in lieu of such real property.
Sec. 5. Any real property hereaffer acquired in fee in viola-
tion of the provisions of this act by any alien mentioned in Sec-
tion 2 of this act, or by any company, association, or corporation
mentioned in Section 3 of this act, shall escheat to and become
and remain the property of the State of California. The attor-
ney-general shall institute proceedings to have the escheat of
such real property adjudged and enforced in the manner provided
by Section 474 of the Political Code, and Title 8, Part 3, of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Upon the entry of final judgment in
such proceedings the title to such real property 'shall pass to the
State of California. The provisions of this'section and of Sec-
tions 2 and 3 of this act shall not apply to any real property here-
after acquired in the enforcement or in satisfaction of any lien
-now existing upon or interest in such property so long as such
real property so acquired shall remain the property of the alien
company, association, or corporation acquiring the same in such
manner.
Sec. 6. Any leasehold or other interest in real property less
than the fee hereafter acquired in violation of the provisions of
this act by any alien mentioned in Section 2 of this act, or by any
company, association, or corporation mentioned in Section 3 of
.this act, shall escheat to the State of California. The attorney-
general shall institute proceedings to have such escheat adjudged
and enforced as provided in Section 5 of this act. In such pro-
.ceedings the court shall determine and adjudge the value of such
leasehold or other interest in such real property ,and enter judg-
ment for the state for the amount thereof, together with costs.
Thereupon the court shall order a sale of the real property cov-
ered by such feasehold or other interest in the manner provided
by Section 1271 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Out of the pro-
ceeds arising froth. such sale the amount of the judgment ren-
dered for the state shall be paid into the state treasury and the
balance shall be deposited with and distributed -by the court in
accordance with the interest of the parties therein.
Sec. 7. Nothing in this act shall be construed as a limitation
,upon -the power of the state to enact 1aws with respect to the
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acquisition, holding, or disposal by aliens of real property in this
state.
Sec. 8. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent or in conflict
with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
Our existing treaty with Japan was made in 1911. Article I
thereof reads as follows:
"The citizens of each of the high contracting parties shall have
liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other,
to carry on trade, wholesale or retail, to own or lease and occupy
houses, manufactories, warehouses, and shops, to employ agents
of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial pur-
poses, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for
trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submit-
ting themselves to the laws and regulations there established."
We are not here considering the diplomatic question as to
whether this law violates the treaty in fact or in spirit. This
part of the treaty is here inserted for the purpose of showing
what rights and privileges as to real property the Japanese are
allowed under Section II of the law. That section is so phrased
that a study of the treaty is essential to an understanding of the
extent of its operation.
The Japanese claim, among other things, that the law is viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in that it is discriminatory legislation. The exact
clause involved reads as follows; "No state shall * * * deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." It must be clearly borne in mind that this protection is
not limited to citizens, but applies to all persons whatsoever. All
aliens are of course persons within the meaning of this clause
as well as all foreign corporations and domestic, corporations
owned by aliens.4 Now it is contended that the classification of
aliens into aliens entitled to citizenship and into aliens not en-
titled to citizenship is an artificial and arbitrary selection, the only
purpose of wbch is to prevent the Japanese from acquiring title
to real property in California.
The questibn of discriminatory legislation by' the states of
course prdsents now no new principle to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The only problem involved is the interpreta-
tion of the facts of this particular controversy in relation to the
4 Cf. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U. S.,
394, and Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S., 121, declaring a
corporation to be a person under this clause.
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judicial history of this clause -of the Constitution. What attitude
the court will take nobody can presume to say, but we may, by
looking back at some of the decisions involving similar problems.
attempt some forecast of the probabilities.
From the adoption of the amendment to the close of the fall
term of 1910 of-the Supreme Court, Federal intervention there-
under has been sought under the "equal protection" clause two
hundred and seventy-three times. Sixty-eight of these cases
arose in the period between 1868 and 1895 and two hundred and
five from 1896 to 1910. During the entire period the Supreme
Court of the United States annulled state action tw~nty-five
times. In eleven of these cases the "equal protection" clause was
the only question involved, while in the fourteen others this clause
was considered along with the "due process of law" clause. This
does not include thirty instances of intervention under the "due
process" clause alone, as the questions involved in the latter cases
related to confiscatory state action rather than to action com-
plained of as discriminatory.
We shall now consider briefly the subject matter of all of those
cases in which state action was annulled as discriminatory,'
Under the "equal protection" clause alone:
1. The right of negroes to sit on juries. There have been six
cases before the Supreme Court on this point, four arising during
the period of reconstruction in the South; one in 1899; and one
in 1903.6 The net result of these decisions is that negroes cannot
be excluded from jury service solely because of their race or
color. They may be excluded on other grounds, such as lack of
education, for instance, but race or color itself cannot be made
the basis of a classification.
7
2. Discrimination against the Chinese engaged in the laundry
business in San Francisco.8 We shall give this case further con-
sideration.
Cf. my paper, "Federal Intervention Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," Yale Law Journal, April, 1912.
6 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S., 303; Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S., 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., 370; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S.,
110; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S., 442; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S., 226.
7 See my paper, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the Nego Race
Question," American Law Review, December, 1911.
8 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356.
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3. Regulation of stock yards in Kansag. Discrimination
against the Kansas City Stock Yards Company.9
4. An anti-trust law of Illinois which exempted agricultural
products and live stock in the hands of the producer from the
operation of its provisions.10
5. Assessment for taxation by the Cook County Board of
Equalization under the laws of Illinois. Discrimination against
certain corporations.1"
6. Classification of corporations under the laws of Alabama
into foreign corporations and domestic corporations and making
certain provisions as to taxation of the former while exempting,
the latter.' 2 We shall have occasion to speak further of the prin
ciples involved in this case.
The following cases involved the interpretation of both the
"equal protection" and the "due process" clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. That is to say, the question of discrimina-
tion and the question of confiscation were considered together.
It is quite probable that this situation may arise as a secondary
consideration out of the present problem. An individual Japan-
ese who purchases a piece of realty would lose it under the pres-
ent law by escheat. He could claim that as a result of this dis-
criminatory legislation his property was confiscated by the state.
Although 9ften thus impleaded it is logically unnecessary to use
one of these clauses to buttress the other. However, it sometimes
happens that the question of discrimination and the question of
confiscation arise independently in the same controversy.
1. A Los Angeles ordinance prescribing territory for the
location of gas works.13
2. A New Orleans ordinance imposing a license tax upon a
foreign corporation. 4
3. Taxation of railroad cars in Kentucky.15
4. Franchise taxes on corporations in California.-
0 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S., 79.
10 Connoly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540.
11 Raymond, Treas. v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S., 20.
12 Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S., 418.
13 Dobbins v. Los.Angeles, 195 U. S., 223.
14 American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 187 U. S., 277.
'5 Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S., 194.
16 Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. California, 118 U. S., 109.
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5. Charter fees for foreign corporations in Kansas.'7
6. The same legislation in Arkansas."
7. The collection of claims against railroads in Texas. 9
8. The regulation of railroad rates in Texas, 20 ' Minnesota, 21
Kentucky,22 Nebraska, 23 and Michigan.24
The general doctrine evolved from these cases is that the state
law must by its terms and by the manner of its enforcement
operate equally upon all persons of the same class. The class of
persons intended to be affected by a particular law must actually
exist as a real distinct class. Classification must exist in fact as
well as in name and the final distinction between classification
and selection must in each concrete case be left to the operation
of the rule of reason in the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the well-known case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 2' the Federal
Supreme Court declared an ordinance of the city of San Fran-
cisco void in that it provided for a manner of enforcement which
allowed a discrimination against the Chinese. In that case the
court went beyond the letter of the law and considered its real
purpose. That purpose was, as everyone knew, to take the laun-
dry business out of the-hands of the Chinese. In the opinion, at
page 369, the Court said: "The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says:
'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These provisions
are universal in their application to all persons within the terri-
torial jurisdiction, wthout regard to any difference of race, of
color, or of nationality, and the equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws."
17 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S., 1; Pullman Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U. S., 156.
18 Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph, Co., 216 U. S., 146.
19 Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S., 150.
20 Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S., 362r
21 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.,
418.
22 Covington Turnpike Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S., 578, and Silver v.
L. & N. R. R. Co., 213 U. S., 175.
2 Snyth v. Anes, 169 U. S., 466, and Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S., 537.
24 Lake Shore & Michigan Railway v. Smith, 173 U. S., 684.
25 118 U. S., 356.
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The question immediately arises as to whether this law under
consideration, which is manifestly discriminatory as to the Jap-
anese, is, in the last analysis, based on considerations of race,
color, or nationality. Is not the dividing of aliens into two
classes, the one eligible to citizenship and the other ineligible, a
mere subterfuge to evade the operaton of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment? It is doubtful if this classification will stand the test even
as it is expressed in the letter of the law. It is certain to fail if
the court goes beyond the letter to the real purpose of this legis-
lation.
In Southern Railway Co. v. Greene,20 the Court said: "The
equal protection of the laws means subjection to equal laws, ap-
plying alike to all in the same situation. If the plaintiff is a per-
son within the jurisdiction of the State of Alabama within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is entitled to stand be-
fore the law upon equal terms, to enjoy the same rights as belong
to, and to bear the same burdens as are imposed upon, other
persons in a like situation." This was a case in which the State
of Alabama attempted to classify corporations doing business in
the state into foreign corporations and domestic corporations,
imposing certain burdens on the former from which the latter
were left free. At page 417, the Court said: "While reasonable
classification is permitted, without doing violence to the equal
protection of the laws, such classification must be based upon
some real and substantial distinction, having a reasonable and
just relation to the things in respect to which such classification
is imposed; and classification cannot be arbitrarily made without
any substantial basis. Arbitrary selection, it has been said, can-
not be justified by calling it classification." In this case the Ala-
bama law was declared void in that the discrimination was un-
reasonable.
If then there can be no classification of corporations engaged
in the same business within the boundaries of the state into those
foreign and those domestic, can there be a classification, as is at-
tempted under the present law, of corporations engaged in the
same business within the state into those whose members are
citizens or aliens eligible to citizenship, and into those the ma-
jority of whose members are aliens not entitled to citizenship ?2T
26216 U. S., 412.
27 See Section 4 of the law.
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Does eligibility to citizenship form a sufficient basis for classifica-
tion in view of these decisions? And does it strengthen the case
of the state that this classification is based proximately on the
treaty rights of the aliens affected? The problem finally resolves
itself into this question: Can persons within the jurisdiction of
the state be put into a class by themselves because, for any reason
whatever, they cannot become citizens and thus subjected to
special legislation imposing burdens not imposed upon other per-
sons? In the opinion of the writer they cannot. The California
law will in all probability be declared void, because to uphold it
would limit the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to citi-
zens and to those eligible to citizenship. To hold otherwise would
mean a new departure for the Supreme Court and the way would
then be opened up for making classifications based upon the
possession, or lack of possession, of other political privileges.
In this discussion we have considered the law as it actually is
rather than as it ought to be. From the standpoint of political
science there is much to be said as to the philosophical back-
ground of the Fourteenth Amendment and as to the political
philosophy which has grown up around it in the courts. We have
not here concerned ourselves with the wisdom and the expediency
of this part of the Federal Constitution for these questions cannot
enter into the strictly legal phase of the problem before us.
Charles Wallace Collins.
Washington, D. C.
